【正文】
現(xiàn)象一直持續(xù)到事后,所以沒(méi)有對(duì)于事后效果的問(wèn)題。所需的股權(quán)回報(bào)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)增加 , 因?yàn)樵黾恿素?cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn):杠桿可能有利 , 但是較高的杠桿作用 ,更大的損失 , 對(duì)于股東來(lái)說(shuō),應(yīng)利用 RNOA 少于借款利率來(lái)把杠 桿轉(zhuǎn)為事后不利。最近的實(shí)證研究提供支持這個(gè)假設(shè)(例如 ,Kemsley 和 Nissim,2021 年 ),但這個(gè)問(wèn)題仍存在爭(zhēng)議。我們預(yù)期這些考 慮 到適用于操作債務(wù)以及金融負(fù)債 , 與之不同的只有程度。羅斯 (1977 年 ), 他們和派爾 ( 1977) 認(rèn)定財(cái)務(wù)選擇作為區(qū)分成因和價(jià)值的標(biāo)志,下文 ( 例如 , Myers and Majluf, 1984) 將深入研究。更多的來(lái)自于進(jìn)一步放寬資本的完美無(wú)摩擦市場(chǎng)假設(shè)原來(lái)的 M 機(jī)電融資無(wú)關(guān)化。在行動(dòng)上,企業(yè)可以施加壟斷權(quán)力,從供應(yīng)商和員工提取價(jià)值。例如 養(yǎng)老金債務(wù),也是根據(jù)雇傭合約,但涉及精算估計(jì)。這種偏見(jiàn)大概不影響價(jià)值,但它們的影響分 賬 返回和定價(jià)的負(fù)債相對(duì)于其 賬 面價(jià)值(價(jià)格到 賬 面價(jià)值比)。通過(guò)利用方程( 13),即杠桿效應(yīng)流經(jīng)到股東盈利能力和回報(bào)。現(xiàn)在的收入低一點(diǎn),否則成本升高。更重要的是,高的運(yùn)營(yíng)債務(wù)和低的運(yùn)營(yíng)資產(chǎn)意味 著低的 值比率 的公平性。( 3)書(shū) 面 價(jià)值只是 1 千億 美元 。一種值得討論的測(cè)量觀點(diǎn)是運(yùn)營(yíng)債務(wù)的借用消費(fèi) 。向我們展示的,這種負(fù)相關(guān)即使存在,也可以證明其正相關(guān)。尤其是,運(yùn)營(yíng)資本可能縮水,因此價(jià)格不同。 對(duì)于運(yùn)營(yíng)債務(wù)杠桿,杠桿平衡包括真實(shí)的契約效應(yīng)和賬目效應(yīng)。運(yùn)營(yíng)債務(wù)杠桿作用和變化可以作為當(dāng)今盈利和以后盈利的風(fēng)向標(biāo)。 operating liability leverage。 pension liabilities, for example, are usually longterm, and shortterm borrowing is a current liability. Rearranging terms in equation (2), Common equity = (operating assets- operating liabilities)- (financial liabilities- financial assets) Or, Common equity = operating assets- financing debt (3) This equation regroups assets and liabilities into operating and ?nancing activities. Net operating assets are operating assets less operating liabilities. So a ?rm might invest in inventories, but to the extent to which the suppliers of those inventories grant credit, the investment in inventories is reduced. Firms pay wages, but to the extent to which the payment of wages is deferred in pension liabilities, the investment required to run the business is reduced. Net ?nancing debt is ?nancing debt (including preferred stock) minus ?nancial assets. So, a ?rm may issue bonds to raise cash for operations but may also buy bonds with excess cash from operations. Its indebtedness is its position in bonds. Indeed a ?rm may be a creditor (with more ?nancial assets than ?nancial liabilities) rather than a debtor. The ine statement can be reformulated to distinguish ine that es from operating and ?nancing activities: Comprehensive ine = operating ine- financing expense (4) Operating ine is produced in operations and ?nancial expense is incurred in the ?nancing of operations. Interest ine on ?nancial assets is ted against interest expense on ?nancial liabilities (including preferred dividends) in ?nancial expense. If interest ine is greater than interest expense, ?nancing activities produce ?nancial ine rather than ?nancial expense. Both operating ine and ?nancial expense (or ine) are after Equations (3) and (4) produce clean measures of aftertax operating pro?tability and the borrowing rate: Return on operating assets (RNOA) = operating ine 247。mon equity RNOA]- [ financing debt247。 there may be a numerator effect on operating ine. Suppliers provide what nominally may be interestfree credit, but presumably charge for that credit with higher prices for the goods and services supplied. This is the reason why operating liabilities are inextricably a part of operations rather than the ?nancing of operations. The amount that suppliers actually charge for this credit is dif?cult to identify. But the market borrowing rate is observable. The amount that suppliers would implicitly charge in prices for the credit at this borrowing rate can be estimated as a benchmark: Market interest on operating liabilities= operating liabilities market borrowing rate where the market borrowing rate, given that most credit is short term, can be approximated by the aftertax shortterm borrowing rate. This implicit cost is benchmark, for it is the cost that makes suppliers indifferent in supplying cred suppliers are fully pensated if they charge implicit interest at the cost borrowing to supply the credit. Or, alternatively, the ?rm buying the goods or services is indifferent between trade credit and ?nancing purchases at the borrowin rate. To analyze the effect of operating liability leverage on operating pro?tability, we de?ne: Return on operating assets (ROOA) =(operating ine+ market interest on operating liabilities)247。M) (1958) ?nancing irrelevance proposition: With perfect capital markets and no taxes or information asymmetry, debt ?nancing has no effect on value. In terms of the residual ine valuation model, an increase in ?nancial leverage due to a substitution of debt for equity may increase expected ROCE according to expression (8), but that increase is offset in the valuation (14) by the reduction in the book value of equity that earns the excess pro?tability and the increase in the required equity return, leaving total value (., the value of equity and debt) unaffected. The required equity return increases because of increased ?nancing risk: Leverage may be expected to be favorable but, the higher the leverage, the greater the loss to shareholders should the leverage turn unfavorable ex post, with RNOA less than the borrowing rate. In the face of the Mamp。mon equity The borrowing rate for total liabilities is: Total borrowing rate = ( financing expense+ market interest on operating liabilities) 247。mon equity (9) The FLEV measure excludes operating liabilities but includes (as a against ?nancing debt) ?nancial assets. If ?nancial assets are greater than ?nancial liabilities, FLEV is negative. The leveraging equation (8) works for negative FLEV (in which case the borrowing rate is the return on ?nancial assets). This analysis breaks shareholder pro?tability, ROCE, down into that which is due to operations and that which is due to ?nancing. Financial leverage levers the ROCE over RNOA, with the leverage effect determined by the amount of ?nancial leverage (FLEV) and the spread between RNOA and the borrowing rate. The spread can be positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable). Operating Liability Leverage and its Effect on Operating Protability While ?nancing debt levers ROCE, operating liabilities lever the pro?ta